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Abstract 
According to Immanuel Kant, the objective validity of obligation is given as a fact of 
reason, which forces itself upon us and which requires no deduction of the kind that he 
had provided for the categories in the Critique of Pure Reason. This fact grounds a moral 
philosophy that treats obligation as a good that trumps all others and that presents the 
moral subject as radically responsible, singled out by an imperatival address. Based on 
conceptions of indifference and facticity that Charles Scott has articulated in his recent 
work, I argue that these broadly Kantian commitments are mistaken. More specifically, I 
argue that the fact of obligation is given along with a dimension of indifference that 
disrupts the hierarchical relation between moral and non-moral goods and that renders 
questionable the unconditional character of responsibility. 
 
 
 There is a lineage of thought that begins decisively with Immanuel Kant, and that 
is carried forward in different ways by Emmanuel Levinas, Jean-François Lyotard, John 
D. Caputo, and many others, that understands ethical experience as grounded in the 
phenomenon of obligation. For all of these thinkers, obligation is irreducible: we cannot 
adequately account for our being obligated in terms of what Kant would call theoretical 
reason or what Lyotard would call cognitive phrases.1 We cannot, in other words, deduce 
a prescription from a description, an ought from an is. No obligation whatever is entailed 
by such descriptions as that we are transcendentally free, that we are God’s creatures, or 
that we were born into communities with more or less settled values. Such descriptions 
always arrive on the scene too late, as attempts to make sense of the obligation that we 
already experience. For all of these thinkers, then, obligation is understood as a kind of 
fact that “forces itself upon us” and that requires no deduction to establish its legitimacy.2 
As practical subjects, we find ourselves having been subjected to this fact always already. 
Genuinely ethical experience happens as a response to, and as a responsibility for, this 
unknowable and incommensurable fact, which is closer to the subject than the subject is 
to itself. 
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 Charles Scott’s work on ethics is not a part of that lineage. Although a large 
percentage of Scott’s work addresses issues in ethics broadly construed, he has had very 
little to say specifically about the phenomenon of obligation. To the best of my 
knowledge, Scott’s only sustained treatment of obligation is given in two papers 
published in 1995 that respond to Caputo’s Against Ethics.3 Outside of those two papers, 
the issue of obligation appears only sporadically and typically in passing. Nonetheless, I 
believe that Scott’s thought has some very interesting and important implications for our 
understanding of obligation and of its place in ethical experience generally. What I would 
like to do in this paper, then, is to bring Scott’s thought, and especially his articulations of 
facticity and indifference, to bear on the lineage of thought that treats obligation as basic. 
I will begin with an attempt to work out as precisely as possible what it means to 
conceive obligation as a fact. Of course that meaning is far from self evident; there is an 
extensive body of secondary literature devoted to figuring out what Kant could have 
meant by the seemingly paradoxical expression “fact of reason.” I want to focus 
specifically on obligation as fact, though, because Scott has a lot of very interesting 
things to say about facts and how they are given, especially in The Lives of Things and 
Living with Indifference. In the second part of the paper, then, I will try to show how 
Scott’s account of the givenness of facts helps to reveal a dimension within the 
phenomenon of obligation that puts into question the broadly Kantian conceptions of 
ethical subjectivity and ethical experience that are taken up by thinkers like Levinas, 
Lyotard, and Caputo. I will conclude with some remarks on what this putting in question 
means for our understanding of ethical experience and ethical life. 
I. Obligation and The Fact of Reason 
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In order to get a handle on what it means to conceive of obligation as a fact, I 
would like to begin with a brief description of the philosophical problem to which that 
conception is proposed as a solution. In the first two sections of his Groundwork of the 
Metaphysics of Morals, Kant develops a determination of the moral law based on what he 
calls “common rational moral cognition.”4 According to Kant, certain concepts such as 
good will, obligation, duty, and moral worth are part of our moral common sense; in 
order to arrive at a precise determination of the moral law, one need only unpack what is 
contained in those concepts. The first two sections of the Groundwork, then, should be 
understood as “merely analytic.”5 Now it is a part of our moral common sense, Kant 
thinks, that the only thing good without limitation is the good will. For finite rational 
beings like us, whose wills are not good simply as a matter of course, the good will is 
made present in the form of obligation, which is the experience of an unconditional 
necessitation. The question that Kant is concerned to answer in the first two sections of 
the Groundwork is, “what kind of law can that be, the representation of which must 
determine the will, even without regard for the effect expected from it, in order for the 
will to be called good absolutely and without limitation?”6 Since the goodness of the 
unconditionally good will cannot be derived from any particular end (since that would 
render the will’s goodness conditional), it can only be the form of lawfulness itself that 
determines our obligations. And the mere form of lawfulness, of course, is expressed in 
the Categorical Imperative: “Act only in accordance with that maxim through which you 
can at the same time will that it become a universal law.”7 Importantly, Kant takes our 
common sense understanding of good will and obligation at face value for the purpose of 
determining the moral law. But throughout the first two sections of the Groundwork, he 
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also holds open the possibility that these concepts are “empty delusion[s]” and 
“chimerical idea[s] without any truth.”8 Although we certainly do experience ourselves as 
obligated, it remains an open question whether we truly are. As Christine M. Korsgaard 
has noted, the problem has its origin in reflection: as rational beings, we are able to take a 
step back from the experienced obligation and to ask whether it is objectively valid. As 
long as the question of objective validity remains open, the subject cannot recognize 
herself as genuinely necessitated.9 In the third section of the Groundwork, then, Kant 
provides a deduction of the objective validity of the moral law. Unfortunately, Kant’s 
deduction fails. At the end of the Groundwork we are left, then, only with the knowledge 
of what the moral law would be, supposing it were objectively valid. We do not yet know 
the most important thing, namely whether we are actually obligated by it. 
In the Critique of Practical Reason, published three years after the Groundwork, 
Kant pursues an entirely new argumentative strategy. Instead of attempting a new 
deduction of the law’s objective validity, he cuts the Gordian knot, asserting that “the 
moral law is given, as it were, as a fact of pure reason of which we are a priori conscious 
and which is apodictically certain, though it be granted that no example of exact 
observance of it can be found in experience. Hence the objective reality of the moral law 
cannot be proved by any deduction, by any efforts of theoretical reason, speculative or 
empirically supported..;” it is “firmly established of itself.”10 This argument, if one can 
even call it that, has met with much resistance. Hegel famously characterized the 
supposed fact of reason as “the last undigested lump in our stomach, a revelation given to 
reason.”11 Rüdiger Bittner has characterized it as “an ad hoc solution, one that secures a 
seemingly indispensable premise by means of a doctrine introduced only to this end.” 
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Instead of presenting an argument to defend the objective validity of the moral law, Kant 
“simply cuts off criticism.”12 And Paul Guyer has similarly suggested that the argument 
relies “on a good deal of foot-stamping.”13 These sorts of criticisms seem reasonable. 
Typically, if someone asserts that x is a fact, she must be prepared to show her work, to 
recreate the process of reasoning that yielded the conclusion that x is indeed a fact. After 
all, according to the well-known etymology, a fact is a factum, a thing done or made, a 
result. From this point of view, Kant’s insistence that x is a fact “firmly established of 
itself” does indeed look like so much foot-stamping. 
 Nonetheless, I believe that Kant’s argument is worthy of more careful 
consideration. I want to argue that the doctrine of the fact of reason gives expression to 
an insight about alterity and incommensurability that comes to play a central role in the 
thought of such figures as Levinas, Lyotard, and Caputo. To show how this is the case, it 
will be important to pay close attention to the precise language of Kant’s argument. At 
numerous points, Kant describes the consciousness of the obligating force of the moral 
law simply as a fact, without qualification.14 On several other occasions, however, Kant 
introduces an important qualification: he speaks of a fact as it were. Given his repeated 
use of the qualification “as it were,” it seems reasonable to suppose that Kant understood 
the fact of reason to be somehow different from ordinary facts. The principle of charity 
requires that we interpret this special kind of fact in the way best suited to solving the 
problem it is clearly intended to solve, namely the problem of showing that our 
experience of ourselves as obligated by the moral law is not an “empty delusion.” If we 
disregard the qualification, treating the fact of reason as an ordinary fact, then we are left 
with the very same problem that Kant had proposed to solve. A fact so conceived would 
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have to be interpreted in one of two ways: either the obligatory character of the moral law 
is a fact of which we are conscious, or else it is simply a fact that we experience 
ourselves as obligated.15 On the first interpretation, the fact of reason would be given as 
the object of our consciousness. That is to say, we would be conscious of the objective 
validity of the moral law in the same sort of way we are conscious of the fact that grass is 
green or that the sun rises in the east. This interpretation of the fact of reason, which can 
be called the “consciousness-of” interpretation, runs into an obvious problem: something 
can appear as the object of our consciousness without having objective validity. I may be 
conscious of the stick in the glass of water as bent, for example, but of course it is not. 
Likewise, I could be conscious of the objective validity of the moral law, but be 
mistaken. To know whether or not any supposed fact given as an object of our 
consciousness was objectively valid, we would require a deduction. But of course that is 
exactly what is supposed to be rendered unnecessary by the fact of reason. The second, 
“consciousness-that,” interpretation fares even worse: it obviously does not follow from 
the fact that we experience ourselves as obligated that we are actually obligated. In sum, 
then, the fact of reason can be neither a fact present to consciousness nor the presence of 
a certain kind of consciousness to itself. Both interpretations suggest very bad arguments 
that do not, in any event, address the problem that Kant had meant to solve. 
If the fact of reason is to solve the problem left by the failed deduction in Section 
Three of the Groundwork, then it must be understood as present to us in such a way that 
we cannot step back from it and call into question its validity. Such a conception would 
solve the problem of reflection that Korsgaard described: there could be no genuine 
question whether the experience of obligation that it gives is objectively valid because 
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there would no space for that question to arise. To be a subject at all would be to find 
oneself subjected to the fact of obligation always already. John D. Caputo suggests such 
an account of obligation in Against Ethics. If we look closely at our real-life, factical 
experiences of being obligated, we see that the question of deducing its objective validity 
simply does not arise: 
Does anyone really wait for cognitive reports to come in before concluding that 
one is obliged? Does one really “conclude” that one is obliged, or does one not 
just find oneself (sich befinden) obliged, without so much as having been 
consulted or asked for one’s consent? Is obligation not a matter of finding oneself 
from the start, always and already, on the receiving end of commands? Is that not 
where we are from the start, and hence where we must begin? Is that not just a 
fact?16 
We can express this insight in the language of phenomenology by saying that there can 
be no epoché of obligation.17 We cannot effectively put out of play our subjection to 
obligations: as Descartes had already recognized, the obligations of daily life continue to 
press against us even as we undertake the project of universal doubt.18 Obligation is given 
first and foremost not as a dubious proposition that stands in need of confirmation, but 
rather as a singular, utterly incommensurable event. To say that obligation happens as 
such an event is precisely to deny that it can be validated by a deduction. In Kant’s 
account from the Groundwork—and much of this persists in the Critique of Practical 
Reason and beyond—the experience of unconditional necessitation points beyond itself 
toward the law, which is understood both as the source and the measure of obligation. We 
are obligated because we are under the law, and the law tells us what we are obligated to 
do. But Caputo argues that this gets it exactly backward: the event of obligation has no 
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“cognitive backup.”19 The principles that we are inclined to think of as the sources of 
obligation are really just ways of trying to make sense of the experience after the fact. 
What is first is the event of obligation, which gives the subject as the addressee of a 
command whose source it cannot know.20 To find oneself obligated is to find oneself 
fixed in place in such a way that one cannot step back to make room for reflection. It is, 
as Caputo puts it, “a kind of Abrahamic Befindlichkeit.”21 
II. Facts in a Passing Sense of Transcendence 
 I find this account of obligation compelling. I agree with Caputo when he writes, 
summarizing the key insights of this lineage of thought, that “obligation happens…. Es 
gibt: there is obligation (Heidegger). Il arrive: it happens (Lyotard). Obligation is a fact, 
as it were (Kant). Here I am (me voici), on the receiving end of an obligation 
(Levinas).”22 But I also believe this account misses an important dimension of the lived 
experience of obligation. I would like to suggest that we can understood this missing 
dimension in terms of Scott’s idea of an excess to meaning that is given with the 
eventuation of meaningful events, an indifference given with our senses of goodness and 
obligation. What is this dimension of indifference? How would it affect our sense of 
obligation if we developed a heightened sensitivity to it? Or perhaps better, how ought 
this dimension to affect our sense of obligation? (I would like to emphasize the “perhaps” 
here; it may turn out that this is not the better question at all.) In what follows I would 
like to pursue these questions, focusing specifically on two points: the facticity of the fact 
of obligation and the subjunctive character of that fact, the “as it were” that seems to be 
inseparable from it. 
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 I would like to begin with the first chapter of The Lives of Things, where Scott 
describes the way in which facts are given, or at least can, in the right circumstances, be 
given. He does not address explicitly anything like the Kantian fact of reason here, 
focusing instead on less “ennobling” or “elevating” facts, e.g., on facts concerning the 
enormously complex and intricate physiological processes that result in normal human 
hearing and facts concerning the formation of pimples. The point that Scott wants to 
argue for is that “facts are as effective as ‘poetic experiences’ in occasioning 
astonishment and a sense of wonder.”23 He describes a conversation with two friends, a 
poet and an artist, who, not surprisingly, disagree: for them, emphasis on facts represents 
“the very kind of objectivity and scientific rationality that we must resist in order to see 
things with astonished attention to their lives.”24 I think there is something self-evidently 
right in the point of view of Scott’s friends. All of us who teach in the era of Wikipedia 
and No Child Left Behind must have some experience with the dulling and flattening of 
thought that comes with fact-based learning. Students might know, for example, that 
Nelson Mandela became president of South Africa in 1994, after having spent much of 
his life imprisoned for opposing apartheid and the government that enforced it. But, at 
least in my experience, they don’t have much appreciation for the inspiring and ennobling 
values of solidarity, persistence, and unshakeable commitment to justice that this fact 
represents. There is no wonder at the enormity of the accomplishment of Mandela and of 
black South Africans generally. It is just a fact, a resource that can be put to use when the 
occasion demands. This kind of technological, fact-centered mode of being-in-the-world 
certainly does seem to be seriously impoverished. 
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 While I think there is indeed something importantly right about the poet’s and the 
artist’s worries, I also think that Scott is right: facts can be as effective as poetic 
experience in giving rise to senses of astonishment and wonder. The facts concerning the 
physiology of human hearing are a case in point: “by means of a package not much larger 
than a sugar cube, ears hear sounds that are found by transmissions of waves of air 
pressure, which are transformed into waves of liquid, which in turn produce miniscule 
movements in tiny hair cells, which excite neurons and bio-electric energy.”25 All of this 
must happen in order for me to pick out the simplest meanings from the world of sound. 
But these processes are not a part of the meaning I pick out: when the barista at Starbucks 
speaks her formulaic sentences to me, I do not take the transformation within my ear of 
air pressure into waves of liquid as part of the sense to which I must respond. All I need 
to do is tell her which beverage I would like to order. That apparently very simple 
meaningful transaction is made possible, not in the Kantian sense, but rather in the most 
physical way, by an occurrence that is indifferent to my meaningful, worldly projects.
 If the poet and the artist are less sensitive than Scott to this astonishing dimension 
in the givenness of facts, it is probably because they are looking for something else. If 
there is a dimension in excess of the banal, flat givenness of facts, it ought to be 
something mysterious; it ought to give a sense of transcendence, a movement toward 
some kind of “higher,” “truer” meaning that puts our everyday, worldly meaning into the 
right perspective.26 A genealogical account would be necessary, I think, to explain why 
people have this expectation about what an excess to the meaning of facts should look 
like. But for present purposes, it should suffice to note that very many people do in fact 
have this kind of expectation. I believe that this sense of transcendence profoundly affects 
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the account of the fact of obligation that is given within the lineage of ethical thought I 
have been describing. This is most obvious in Levinas, who describes the experience of 
the face-to-face with the Other in terms of the withdrawn God who is present only in the 
form of an interpellation. But one can certainly recognize the sense of transcendence in 
Kant’s account of obligation as well: once one has genuinely adopted the moral point of 
view, he thinks, “one can in turn never get enough of contemplating the majesty of [the 
moral] law, and the soul believes itself elevated in proportion as it sees the holy elevated 
above itself and its frail nature.”27 And according to Caputo, obligation “is transcendence 
itself.”28 
 How could we understand the excess of meaning that is given along with facts, 
including the fact of obligation, if not as a kind of transcendence? On Scott’s account, 
this excess is given as “a dimension of no meaning and hence no order of meaning in 
ordered meanings’ very happenings.”29 There is, in other words, a dimension of no 
meaning that is co-present with meaningful dimensions of our lives, but without those 
dimensions belonging to the same space of meaning. It is not the case, for example, that 
the excessive dimension is “higher,” giving us a superior vantage point from which to 
discern the truth of our everyday lives. Nor is it a dimension of depth, revealing more 
profound meanings. In both of these cases, the excessive dimension functions to produce 
new and better meaning. The dimension that Scott is concerned to describe, on the other 
hand, is not productive in this way; it gives itself as an irreducible indifference to 
meaning right in the midst of ordinary meaning. In Living with Indifference, Scott 
provides close descriptions of many different ways in which the dimension of 
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indifference becomes manifest, but for now I would like to focus on Scott’s account of 
trauma. In response to a traumatic event, the body 
produces a prereflective memory trace that can operate as though the past danger 
were present. The amygdala function apparently knows nothing of place and time 
and is also a center for instinctive memory. The function of the hypothalamus, on 
the other hand, provides spatial and temporal context for events. As long as there 
is cooperation between these two functions a person experiences a traumatic 
event as past and can remember its emotions in a spatial context as well. It was 
then at that place. But if there is only amygdalic impression without 
hypothalamic qualification, the instinctual memory in that dissociation will lack 
context and the traumatic stress could come to presence at any time or place.30 
As Kant showed in the Transcendental Aesthetic of the Critique of Pure Reason, 
meaningful experience presupposes the capacity to situate things and events 
spatiotemporally. One could not form even the most banal judgments of experience—say 
the judgment that the pen is blue—if one could not first isolate the subject term of the 
judgment as a single, unified object in space and time. But in severe trauma, the subject 
finds herself haunted by an “event” that is not submitted to these conditions of meaning. 
Indeed, from the sufferer’s point of view, the cause of the trauma is not even an event, 
since it cannot be mapped onto the coherent order of experience that is made possible by 
spatiotemporal qualification. The subject tries to make sense of the trauma, integrating it 
into the order of meaning, but she finds it extraordinarily difficult to do so. “In this case, 
the body’s faceless functioning comes to the fore; good sense and meaning fade away, 
and a physical dimension without intelligent, spatial, or temporal intention provides the 
traumatic presentation of a life.”31 The dimension of indifference is just there, stubbornly 
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present in the midst of other dimensions of the sufferer’s day-to-day life, which remain 
just as meaningful as they had always been. 
 Of course it is not the case that the dimension of indifference is given only in the 
experience of trauma. Indeed, its difference from transcendence can be brought out most 
clearly if we think of the way it is given in the experience of astonishment. According to 
Scott, astonishment is an event that “exceeds a person’s expectations at the moment, 
comes usually without warning, takes over one’s affections, commands attention, 
surpasses considerably the reach of calculations, is without boredom, and happens 
exorbitantly with all of the events’ meanings and determinations.”32 This dimension of 
excess does not add new and better meanings to our experience, nor does it cross out, in 
the Husserlian sense of the term, our familiar meanings. As in the case of trauma, we 
experience something excessive to meaning right in the midst of meaning.   
I believe that Kant, in his discussion of contempt from the Metaphysics of Morals, 
wrote out of a sensibility to this dimension of indifference. According to Kant, “to be 
contemptuous of others (contemnere), that is, to deny them the respect owed to human 
beings in general, is in every case contrary to duty, for they are human beings.”33 This 
argument concerning the wrongness of contempt is framed, of course, in explicitly moral 
language. Remarkably, though, what is called for by Kant’s own argument is precisely a 
suspension of the application of moral conceptuality. The moral goodness or badness of 
the person with whom we are dealing is given as entirely irrelevant: even if the person 
has acted in ways that render him utterly unworthy of the most basic respect, we must 
nonetheless refrain from treating him with contempt. As rational beings for whom pure 
practical reason is legislative in the domain of freedom, we cannot help judging liars, 
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gluttons, drunkards, lackeys, and the like to be contemptible any more than we can help 
judging in the realm of nature that an observed event has a cause. But “the outward 
manifestation of this is, nevertheless, an offense.”34 There is, it seems, something 
astonishing that happens in our encounters with others, something that happens 
exorbitantly to the moral sense that we cannot help applying to their actions and to their 
lives. This excess of sense does not reverse our established moral sense, such that others’ 
vices appear as virtues and their virtues as vices, nor does it negate or cross that sense 
out. It does not clarify the law that is given to us by pure practical reason, nor does it help 
us to apply the law more judiciously. If anything, it renders the application of the law to 
experience more difficult: what exactly does it mean to manifest contempt, and how can 
we be sure that we have not done so? The dimension of excess, indifferent to moral 
sense, is simply co-present with our familiar moral conceptuality. The fact of 
astonishment, then, functions very differently from the way the fact of reason has 
typically been understood to function in the second Critique. The fact of reason, as we 
have seen, functioned to secure a very tight bond between our practical activity and the 
moral law. Specifically, it functioned to rule out any questionability concerning the law’s 
exclusive right to legislate in the moral domain. The fact of astonishment, on the other 
hand, introduces a gap between ourselves as practical subjects and our own legislative 
practical reason, and thus loosens the hold of the moral law on our practical being-in-the-
world. The sense given by the moral law persists, but it is no longer the only relevant 
sense, and perhaps not even the predominant sense. 
III. Obligation and the Subjunctive Indeterminacy of the Fact of Reason 
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 This conception of facticity, and of the dimension of indifference that happens 
with it, suggests some important conclusions for our understanding of obligation, 
understood in the broadly Kantian sense of the term. In what follows, I would like to 
focus on two of these conclusions. First, I believe that Scott’s account of indifference 
poses a challenge to the idea that obligation is made present most basically as an 
imperative addressed to the practical subject, singling her out and rendering her 
unconditionally responsible. Here I would like to turn once again to the “as it were” that 
qualifies Kant’s fact of reason. I believe we can shed much light on the meaning of this 
qualification by thinking of it in terms of what Scott in Living with Indifference calls 
“subjunctive indeterminacy.” According to Scott,  
the subjunctive mood subjoins indeterminacy with a determinate state of affairs 
and expresses something by reference to an elision, a ‘gappiness,’ which is said 
to be in the way something happens. This grammatical trope integrates by 
signifying an elision of factual literalness and direction in factual events. The 
subjunctive mood recalls a nonfactual dimension of facts. Or, I could say, the 
subjunctive mood is a trope that bespeaks a withdrawal of factuality in the 
occurrence of facts.35 
In the givenness of facts, including, I think, the fact of obligation, there is something that 
exceeds the kind of facticity whose sense can be exhausted in declarative sentences. 
There is given right at the fact a dimension of contingency and open possibility that is not 
itself a fact. In the subjunctive mood, the fact is a fact as it were, gleichsam als ein 
Factum. In the appearance of subjunctive indeterminacy, there is something exorbitant to 
the manifest sense of the appearing. But that something is not a something “behind” the 
appearance that can be figured as the ground of that appearance and of its sense, be it 
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God, the Other, or the moral law within. The subjunctive dimension is neutral, 
indifferent. 
 The whole purpose of treating obligation as a fact, as something that requires no 
deduction to establish its legitimacy, was to put a stop to the process of reflection by 
which the practical subject could always step back from the felt obligation and ask 
whether it might not be an empty delusion. Obligation is a fact, as it were, and as such it 
has a hold on the practical subject always already. To be a practical subject at all just is to 
be subjected to a call, a command that singles one out, rendering one irreducibly 
responsive and responsible to that call. This is the idea that Caputo expressed so lucidly 
in the passage cited above: “one is fixed in place by obligation. You cannot mount it or 
surmount it, get a distance on it, get beyond (jenseits) it, overcome (überwinden) it, or lift 
it up (aufheben). It is older than we are, at least as old as Being or Truth or the Sprit or 
the Will to Power…. Obligation is a kind of Abrahamic Befindlichkeit.” We cannot get a 
distance from obligation—we are fixed in place by it—because we are given to ourselves 
as practical subjects only in its imperatival address. But Scott’s account of the 
subjunctive indeterminacy of facticity suggests a dimension of questionability right at 
that point where all doubt was supposed to have been eradicated. There is a dimension in 
the fact of obligation that is indifferent, that does not happen in the accusative case. In the 
appearing of the fact of obligation, there is a gap, an indeterminate space that opens up 
between the practical subject and the experienced obligation. Contrary to Caputo’s 
assertion, then, we are not fixed in place by obligation; we can get a distance on it. Right 
there with the subject as obligated, singled out as the addressee of a demand that comes 
from who knows where—right there with the experience of the Abrahamic me voici—
 17 
there is a dimension of subjunctive indeterminacy, of indifferent difference from moral 
orientation. The practical subject is responsible, then, but not unconditionally; 
responsible subjectivity happens with a dimension of optionality and questionability that 
exceed the conceptuality of the ethics of obligation. 
 In the chapter from The Lives of Things titled “Starlight in the Face of the Other,” 
Scott presents his most forceful and direct challenge to the conception of the ethical 
subject as singled out and as rendered unconditionally responsible by an imperatival 
address. The chapter presents a critical account of Levinas’s account of alterity and the 
epiphany of the face. According to Levinas, “the face opens the primordial discourse 
whose first word is obligation, which no ‘interiority’ permits avoiding.”36 In the face-to-
face encounter with the Other, there occurs an upsurge of meaning that exceeds the 
subject’s capacity for appropriation. This disappropriating event happens as the 
unconditional command, “you shall not commit murder,” which singularizes the practical 
subject, fixing her in place and summoning her to respond.37 The I, then, is “by its very 
position, responsibility through and through.”38 The I’s subjection to the Other, on this 
account, is simply a fact: it is given immediately, and cannot be discovered as the 
conclusion to any chain of reasoning. According to Scott, though, Levinas’s account of 
the facticity of this fact is insufficiently radical, centered as it is on a traditionally 
phenomenological, identity-based conception of subjectivity. There is a dimension of 
non-meaning, on Scott’s account, that happens right along with the fact of obligation and 
that is not present in the form of a command addressed to the subject. In the experience of 
the face-to-face, there is revealed a kinship with a materiality that is radically more other 
than Levinas’s Other, something that “seems to precede and to recede from meaningful 
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appearances.”39 This materiality is not present as a meaningful ethical command 
addressed to “me;” we respond to it not as obligated subjects, but rather anonymously 
and pre-personally, the way fungi or protozoa respond to light.40 More specifically, when 
we look into the eye of the other, we find ourselves in the presence of minerals that 
were all formed in the implosion of stars that were trillions of miles and millions 
of years from where we see[. The] calcium, potassium, sodium, iodine, and 
phosphorus—all the primary and trace minerals in our eyes—were formed in the 
unspeakable heat and pressure of stars that collapsed upon themselves and then 
exploded, sending both light energy and mineral components in an unspeakable 
tumult throughout the universe.41 
The stardust in the eyes of the other does not address to us the command “you shall not 
commit murder,” or any other command for that matter. It is too other for that, too far 
beyond the scope of human understanding. The dimension of non-meaning given in the 
eyes of the other is simply indifferent to ethical concern.   
Once again, this is not to suggest that the dimension of ethical meaning that 
happens in the face-to-face is completely neutralized by the dimension of indifference 
that Scott describes. I can report that when I encounter the stranger, the widow, or the 
orphan, I experience a strong (though not quite unconditional) obligation to help. This 
feeling of necessitation persists even after I conclude in particular cases that my efforts to 
help will be ineffective. The point, rather, is just that before the Other, the practical 
subject is not “responsibility through and through,” that there is a distance and a 
questionability that happen right along with the experienced obligation.  
 The second feature of the ethics of obligation that is challenged by Scott’s 
account of indifference is the priority it assigns to specifically moral considerations in our 
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practical lives. Duty, according to this lineage of ethical thought, is given in moral 
experience as a good that trumps all others. This can be seen especially clearly in a 
passage from Section 6 of the Critique of Practical Reason, just prior to the introduction 
of the fact of reason. Having just argued for the reciprocity thesis, according to which 
freedom and the moral law reciprocally imply each other, Kant attempts to determine 
which of these two functions as the starting point for moral experience: does our 
consciousness of freedom lead us to the recognition that we are unconditionally obligated 
by the moral law, or does our recognition of ourselves as unconditionally obligated lead 
us to the consciousness of freedom? The former possibility is quickly ruled out, as we 
have no immediate consciousness of freedom in experience. It must be the case, then, that 
our moral experience begins with our immediate consciousness of the bindingness of the 
moral law. The law is present to us, according to Kant, as a determining ground of the 
will that is “not to be outweighed by any sensible conditions.”42 To support his 
contention that we do in fact experience obligation as trumping all other practical goods, 
Kant proposes a thought experiment: suppose that a prince demands of his subject that he 
“give false testimony against an honorable man whom the prince would like to destroy 
under a plausible pretext.”43 Suppose further that the prince threatens the subject with 
immediate execution if he should refuse to give the false testimony. Is it possible in this 
case for the subject to do as the moral law commands, overriding his natural and 
powerful inclination to preserve his own life? Kant believes that the answer is obviously 
yes. That is not to say, of course, that the subject would in fact perform his duty. The 
important point, though, is that the subject would certainly recognize himself as being 
able to do it. He can because he ought. That he ought is not an open question; his 
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consciousness of his obligation is what, a page later, will be called the fact of reason. To 
be conscious of the bindingness of obligation, then, just is to be conscious of that 
obligation as overriding all non-moral goods, including the good of life itself. 
 In Chapter Three of the second Critique, “On the Incentives of Pure Practical 
Reason,” Kant describes in greater detail how it comes to be that non-moral goods are 
given as trumped by the demands of duty. Things or states of affairs are presented to us 
as good, in the non-moral sense of the term, by our inclinations. As finitely rational 
beings, we cannot help experiencing the inclinations as making claims on us, as 
providing what purport to be compelling reasons to pursue particular courses of action. 
Following the lead of the inclinations, we tend naturally toward self-love, or a 
predominant benevolence toward ourselves.44 When this “self-love makes itself 
lawgiving and the unconditional practical principle, it can be called self-conceit.”45 Now 
the consciousness of the unconditional bindingness of the moral law—which is given as 
the sole fact of pure reason—just is a consciousness of the humiliation of our self-
conceit. Our natural inclination toward securing happiness is thwarted, causing us to 
experience the unique kind of pain called respect. In the feeling of respect, we become 
immediately aware of the law and of its superiority to the kinds of goods that are revealed 
to us by the inclinations. To be conscious of the law, then, is necessarily to be conscious 
of its overriding all other goods; there is, on Kant’s account, no space for any question 
concerning the supremacy of obligation to arise. And as we have seen, one of the primary 
functions of the strategy of the fact of reason in Kant’s moral philosophy was precisely to 
rule out the possibility of such genuine moral questionability. 
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 This account treats goods as falling neatly into two categories: moral and non-
moral. It is the fact of reason itself that first gives this dualism of goods: according to 
Kant, there is no such distinction in the experience of non-human animals, who know 
only the non-moral goods of inclination, or of angels, who know only the moral good 
presented by pure practical reason. And in giving this dualism of goods, the fact of reason 
immediately gives morality itself. But as Scott has shown, facts are, or at least can be, 
given along with a dimension of subjunctive indeterminacy: the determination of moral 
consciousness by the sharp division between moral and non-moral goods, with the latter 
given unambiguously as trumping the former, is subjoined with indeterminateness and a 
certain “gappiness” that sets the very eventuation of things into relief.46 With a sensibility 
to this subjunctive indeterminacy, we can recognize a remainder of sense that does not 
fall within the moral/non-moral dichotomy: persons and things “stand out in their ‘just-
so’ quality, their nonreducibility to anything else, in the simultaneous palpability and 
impalpability of their events.”47 This sensibility, Scott suggests, can be especially acute in 
the time of dying, when our past accomplishments and our future prospects come to 
appear less significant. With the letting go that can accompany the process of dying, the 
lives of things “stand out as they come to pass.” When that happens, “their differences, 
their own lives, their being there as they are could well stand out as wonderful, as, just 
so….”48 In the draw that we experience toward the eventuation of things in their just-so 
qualities, obligation recedes; we experience these things neither as objects of our 
pathologically-determined, self-serving inclinations nor as objects falling under the 
legislation of pure practical reason. Specifically moral determinations, in sum, come to 
appear as questionable. Not questionable in a subjective and provisional sense, such that 
 22 
a bit more reflection would yield the correct answers, but questionable rather as an 
irreducible dimension of their coming to appear. Moral sense is questionable through and 
through, and the locus of this questionability is in the thing itself, not within the moral 
subject. The kind of moral being-in-the-world that is characterized by the ethics of 
obligation comes therefore to appear as contingent, and thus as optional. But a contingent 
ethics of obligation is not an ethics of obligation at all, at least as this is understood in the 
broadly Kantian sense. 
 What I hope to have shown, especially in this last section, is that obligation is not 
the alpha and the omega of ethical experience. And this is just because obligation is not 
even the alpha and the omega of the experience of obligation. There is a dimension of 
indifference to obligation in the very happening of obligation. And this dimension of 
indifference makes a difference. It is present within ethical experience as rendering that 
experience questionable. What, then, ought we to do with this questionability? What 
demands does it make on us? How can we know how to respond appropriately? These 
questions are difficult, if not impossible, to answer. The fact of obligation, with its 
dimension of subjunctive indeterminacy, does not orient us toward a law that would tell 
us immediately and unambiguously how we ought to respond. Rather, from within a 
sensibility that is attuned to dimensions of indifference, these sorts of questions are given 
as ones that we must—in a decidedly non-moral sense of this term—keep open. 
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